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OUTSOURCING ENFORCEMENT: PRINCIPLES TO
GUIDE SELF-POLICING REGIMES
Sarah L. Stafford*

When the case for market-based approaches rests on axioms rather
than analysis, the conversation becomes at once dull and dangerous.
-John Donahue'
INTRODUCTION

In his book Outsourcing Sovereignty, Paul Verkuil warns us to be
wary of the possible threats to "democratic principles of accountability
and process in what has been a largely unexamined shift from private to
public governance." 2 Verkuil notes that the public and private sectors
have different boundaries, and suggests that since outsourcing tests
those boundaries, governments should "justify delegations of public
power to private hands." 3
This goal of this Article is to examine one particular form of
outsourcing-the outsourcing of regulatory enforcement to the
regulated entities themselves, a practice known as self-policing-to
determine whether this type of delegation of public power can be
justified as being in the public interest. Part II offers an overview of the
particular concerns Verkuil and others have expressed regarding
outsourcing in general. Part III provides a definition of self-policing
and discusses both the theoretical justifications for the practice as well
as the potential pitfalls. Heeding the words quoted above, Part IV
presents a case study of the Environmental Protection Agency's selfpolicing program, assessing the extent to which it is a defensible form
of outsourcing. Part V reviews a number of other federal self-policing
programs with a brief assessment of their strengths and weaknesses.
Finally, Part VI suggests some general guidelines for self-policing
* Paul R. Verkuil Distinguished Professor of Economics, Public Policy, and Law, College of
William and Mary, Williamsburg, VA.
I John D. Donahue, Market-Based Governance and the Architecture of Accountability, in
MARKET-BASED GOVERNANCE: SUPPLY SIDE, DEMAND SIDE, UPSIDE, AND DOWNSIDE

WASHINGTON 1,3 (John D. Donahue & Joseph S. Nye eds., 2002).
2 PAUL R. VERKUIL, OUTSOURCING SOVEREIGNTY: WHY PRIVATIZATION OF GOVERNMENT
FUNCTIONS THREATENS DEMOCRACY AND WHAT WE CAN Do ABOUT IT 2 (2007).
3 Id. at 1.
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programs to ensure that they are justifiable delegations of public power
to private hands.
I.

THE CONCERN OVER OUTSOURCING

Privatization can generally be defined as "the practice of
delegating public duties to private organizations." 4 The concept of
privatization was initially imported from Thatcher's Britain in the early
1980s. 5 The movement flourished in the United States because of its
resonance with two political trends taking place at the time: a
rejuvenated interest in private enterprise and the push for decreased
government spending in response to large budget deficits. 6
The push for privatization or outsourcing 7 is based on the belief
that the market can provide public activities either at a lower cost than
the government can provide them, or can provide a more beneficial
alternative at the same cost as the publicly provided alternative. If an
action can be done more cheaply by the government than by the private
sector, or if the government can provide a higher quality good or service
than the private sector, there is no public benefit or justification for
outsourcing. That is, proof that outsourcing lowers costs or increases
benefits without increasing costs should be a necessary condition for
endorsing it.
However, even if an activity can be done more efficiently by the
private sector, privatization may not ultimately be in the public interest.
Perhaps the most loudly voiced concern about outsourcing has to do
with the potential loss in accountability that can occur when
government functions are transferred to private agents. 8 The term
"accountability" as used in this Article means the ability of the public to
demand an explanation or justification from an actor for its actions and
to reward or punish that actor on the basis of its performance or its
explanation. 9 Obviously, for one's actions to be accountable, they must
4 JOHN D. DONAHUE, THE PRIVATIZATION DECISION: PUBLIC ENDS, PRIVATE MEANS 3
(1989). This definition applies primarily to the United States. In many other countries, the term
is often used to denote the selling of public assets to private parties. Id. at 6.
5 Id. at 4.

6 Id. at 3.

7 Following Verkuil, I use the term "outsourcing" as a synonym for privatization. See
VERKUIL, supra note 2, at 4.
8 See Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 574

(2000) (noting that private entities are one step further removed from direct accountability to the
electorate, and that they remain relatively insulated from the legislative, executive, and judicial
oversight to which agencies must submit); see also VERKUIL, supra note 2, at 7 (noting that given
the current level of outsourcing, accountability is lacking).
9 This is the same definition for "accountability" used in VERKUIL, supra note 2, at 7 n.38,
and is generally consistent with Donahue's use of the term. See DONAHUE, supra note 4, at 23
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first be transparent. Privatized actions are generally less transparent
than public actions, particularly since the Freedom of Information Act
does not apply to private contractors.' 0
A second concern is that inherently governmental functions are
currently being outsourced.11 When a government delegates its
sovereign powers to private entities, its capacity to govern is
diminished. The Constitution enumerates a number of activities that
must be performed by particular branches of government.12 In addition,
the Federal Activities Inventory Reform Act of 1998 prevents agencies
from contracting out inherently governmental activities.13 However,
most inherently governmental activities are not clearly defined, and thus
there are concerns that some are currently being outsourced.14
A third concern is that privatization may reduce governmental
capacity and thus impede the optimal evolution of public policy. As
Jody Freeman notes, "[t]he process of [policy] design, implementation,
and enforcement is fluid"' 5 and public policy is constantly evolving. As
regulators implement and enforce regulations, they collect information
and experiences that can be used to improve the next iteration of that
regulation or related regulations. Under outsourcing, information or
experience gained during the performance of an activity will accrue to
private parties, rather than public employees. While some of this
information or experience might be transferred to public agencies as
part of the outsourcing contract, it is likely that some-perhaps mostwill not be. This loss of information and experience could interfere
with the optimal evolution of policy and could also undermine the
future performance of government agencies. A similar concern is that

("Accountability means that government action accords with the will of the people it
represents . . . ").
10 VERKUIL, supra note 2, at 105.
11 The Federal Activities Inventory Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-270, 112 Stat. 2382,
defines the term "inherently governmental function" as "a function that is so intimately related to
the public interest as to require performance by Federal Government employees," including
"activities that require either the exercise of discretion in applying Federal Government authority
or the making of value judgments in making decisions for the Federal Government, including
judgments relating to monetary transactions and entitlements."
12 For example, the legislative power is entrusted to Congress in Article I while Article II
assigns executive power, the Commander-in-Chief function, the appointment power, the power to
conduct foreign affairs, and the granting of pardons to the President. U.S. CONST. Arts. I, II.
13 Pub. L. No. 105-270, 112 Stat. 2382.
14 Although the Office of Management and Budget is currently working on a new policy to
provide uniform guideline for determining activities that must be performed by federal
employees, see Work Reserved for Performance by Federal Government Employees: Proposed
Policy Letter, 75 Fed. Reg. 16,188 (Mar. 31, 2010), the policy will still leave a reasonable amount
of discretion to agencies to classify activities. The concern that inherently governmental
activities are being outsourced is a primary argument in Verkuil's book, supra note 2.
15 Freeman, supra note 8, at 572.
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outsourcing may have serious implications for maintaining institutional
knowledge within the government. 16
Finally, there is the concern that outsourcing may lead to increased
corruption by exacerbating the "revolving door" through which former
government officials obtain positions in private contractors and vice
versa. 17

II.

THE CASE FOR SELF-POLICING

A.

What Is Self-Policing?

There is no widely accepted formal definition of self-policing,
perhaps because the term itself seems to be relatively self-explanatory.
In the regulatory context, self-policing is essentially the delegation of
enforcement responsibilities to the regulated entities themselves.' 8 The
delegation can be partial-that is, a regulator can allow facilities to selfpolice but continue to have a formal enforcement program as well-or
complete.
Consider the following simplistic description of a purely public
enforcement regime. In this regime public officials determine whether a
regulated entity is in compliance by inspecting or auditing the entity.
These inspections are not made on a set schedule, nor is there any
announcement prior to the inspection taking place. If the inspection or
audit shows that the entity has violated a regulation, depending on the
seriousness of the violation, the official may issue an informal notice or
warning, initiate a civil administrative action under the agency's own
authority, or refer civil or criminal judicial actions to the Department of
Justice. Depending on the route taken, sanctions can be imposed
through negotiated settlements or decisions by the court. Such
16 See VERKUIL, supra note 2, at 4 (stating that one of the ways outsourcing undermines
government performance is by atrophying government's power to perform these functions in the
future); id at 6 (noting that outsourcing in DHS causes demoralization in the civil service and
that maintaining significant functions in-house is crucial to the preservation of the civil service).
17 Id. at 5 n.23 (noting that career officials are less likely to be corrupted because they have a
long-term commitment to their agency and they are less likely to take advantage of outsourcing
opportunities).
18 This definition of the term "self-policing" is consistent with EPA's use of the term, see
Incentives for Self-Policing: Discovery, Disclosure, Correction and Prevention of Violations, 60
Fed. Reg. 66705 (Dec. 22, 1995), although EPA never formally defined the term. Other
regulatory agencies do not necessarily use the term in the same way. For example, the Securities
and Exchange Commission uses the term self-policing to describe a company's voluntary
auditing and compliance-monitoring efforts, but does not include self-disclosure in its definition.
See Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, SEC Issues Report of Investigation and Statement
Setting Forth Framework for Evaluating Cooperation in Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion (Oct.
at
http://www.sec.gov/news/headlines/
23,
2001),
available
prosdiscretion.htm.

2011]

OUTSOURCING ENFORCEMENT

2297

sanctions require remediation of the violation (where applicable), and
may include monetary penalties or incarceration in the case of criminal
violations. 19
Under self-policing, regulated entities conduct "self-audits" to
determine whether they are in compliance with regulations. 20 The term
self-audit merely means that the regulated entity makes the decision to
audit, not that it necessarily conducts the audit itself. If the self-audit
shows that the entity has violated a regulation, the entity reports that
violation to officials who then decide how to proceed. Thus, under selfpolicing, both the act of auditing and the disclosure of any discovered
violations have been "outsourced" to the regulated entity. However,
regulatory officials generally maintain responsibility for the imposition
of any penalties or fines, as well as the determination of what the
regulated entity must do to correct or remediate its violation. 21
A key component of self-policing is that the decision to self-police
is a voluntary decision. A mandatory requirement that regulated entities
must conduct self-audits (or more generally must monitor performance)
and report violations to authorities is not self-policing; such a
requirement is an additional regulation with which a regulated entity
can choose to comply and which authorities will need to enforce. 22 For
example, the Clean Water Act requires regulated entities to measure the
level of pollutants in wastewater discharges and report them to EPA or
19 This simplistic description is not an attempt to describe any particular enforcement regime,
although it is generally consistent with EPA's enforcement regime. See generally ROBERT
ESWORTHY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 34384, FEDERAL POLLUTION CONTROL LAWS: How
ARE THEY ENFORCED? (2010); OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN., OSHA 2098,
OSHA INSPECTIONS (2002), availableat http://www.osha.gov/Publications/osha2098.pdf.

20 I use the term "self-audit" to denote activities conducted by a regulated entity to determine
whether the entity has violated any regulations. Self-audits are roughly equivalent to the concept
of "corporate enforcement costs," employed in Jennifer Arlen, The PotentiallyPerverseEffects of
Corporate Criminal Liability, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 833 (1994) (defining "corporate enforcement

costs" as corporate expenditures on detecting and investigating crimes by employees).
21 Some self-policing policies do specify the particular penalties or fines (or lack thereof) that
will be imposed on self-disclosed violators. Although some fines may thus be automatic,
regulatory officials are ultimately responsible for setting those automatic fines when the policy is
established and presumably can choose to modify them.
22 I use the term "self-reporting" to denote the requirement that regulated entities self-report
information to an agency, which is consistent with the use of the term by Jon D. Harford, SelfReportingof Pollutionand the Firm's Behavior Under Imperfectly Enforceable Regulations, 14 J.
ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 293 (1987), and Arun S. Malik, Self-Reporting and the Design of
Policies for Regulating Stochastic Pollution, 24 J. ENvTL. EcoN. & MGMT. 241 (1993).

However, this distinction between the terms "self-policing" and "self-reporting" is not
consistently used, at least within the economic literature on enforcement. See Louis Kaplow &
Steven Shavell, Optimal Law Enforcement with Self-Reporting of Behavior, 102 J. POL. ECON.

583, 583 (1994) ("A commonly observed feature of law enforcement is what we shall call selfreporting of behavior: the reporting by parties of their own harm-producing actions to an
enforcement authority."). The two primary distinctions between self-policing and self-reporting,
as I use the terms, are (1) that self-policing always pertains to a violation, while self-reporting can
occur when a facility is in complete compliance, and (2) self-policing is voluntary while selfreporting can be mandatory.
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the state on a regular basis regardless of whether the emissions are
within or exceed permitted limits. 23 Failure to adhere to permit limits
results in one penalty if the violation is self-reported and a higher
penalty if it is not reported or is falsely reported and later discovered by
authorities. The difference between the two penalties is thus the
punishment associated with violating the reporting requirement.
There is, of course, nothing to stop a regulated entity from
voluntarily reporting a violation of any existing regulation. However, in
general, profit-maximizing facilities will not voluntarily undertake
costly self-audits and turn themselves in for discovered violations unless
there is some type of inducement for doing so. The primary inducement
used to encourage self-policing is a lower fine or penalty for selfdisclosed violations than for violations detected by regulators through
traditional channels (i.e., inspections or third party reports). A selfpolicing policy could also completely waive any fines associated with
the self-disclosed violation. 24 A second type of inducement could be
reduced external enforcement at the regulated entity-either in the same
period as the self-disclosure or in future periods. The implications that
both types of inducements can have for the costs and benefits of the
self-policing policy are discussed in more detail in the next Part.
Self-policing should not be confused with self-regulation, as selfregulation is a distinctly different activity (although this term also
suffers from a lack of a widely accepted formal definition). Perhaps the
most well-defined type of self-regulation is "audited self-regulation,"
which has been formally defined as "congressional or agency delegation
of power to a private self-regulatory organization to implement and
enforce laws or agency regulations with respect to the regulated entities,
with powers of independent action and review retained by the
agency." 25 Thus, under audited self-regulation, regulated entities
collectively develop regulatory standards which are then enforced by
both the regulated entities and the agency. 26 In contrast, under self23 See 40 C.F.R. § 122 (2010) for a general description of the National Pollutant Discharge
Elimination System (NPDES) and 40 C.F.R. § 122.41(1) for the specific reporting requirements.
24 However, a full reduction in penalties might induce entities to stop complying and selfpolicing to avoid any fine. Of course, any positive payment to those self-policing could induce
regulated entities to violate regulations deliberately in order to receive the payment for selfdisclosure, and thus should not be part of any self-policing policy where violations are the result
the regulated entities' actions.
25 See Recommendations of the Administrative Conference of the United States, 1 C.F.R.
§ 305.94-1 (1992) ("The Use of Audited Self-Regulation as a Regulatory Technique"). ACUS
recommendations were published periodically in the Code of Federal Regulations prior to 1995.
The recommendations are no longer published in the CFR, but are available at Recommendations

of the Administrative Conference of the United States, ABA ADMIN.

PROC. DATABASE,

http://www.law.fsu.edu/library/admin/acus/acustoc.html (last visited June 19, 2011).
26 While self-regulatory regimes generally include some form of self-policing, the
development of standards by regulated entities is the focus of the literature on self-regulation.
For the purposes of this paper, I am not considering self-regulatory regimes.
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policing, regulated entities enforce standards established by the agency
using the traditional rule-making process.
B.

The PotentialEfficienciesfrom Self-Policing

Over the past two decades, economists developed a wide range of
theoretical models of self-policing regimes in order to study the welfare
consequences of such regimes. 27 Not surprisingly, the results of these
theoretical inquiries are sensitive to assumptions about the exact form
that such regimes might take. Some models predict that self-policing
allows regulators to shift enforcement resources from those who do selfpolice to other facilities, thereby increasing the level of compliance
(which by assumption increases overall welfare) 28 for a given level of
enforcement resources. Alternatively, self-policing allows regulators to
achieve the same level of compliance for a lower expenditure of
enforcement resources. 29 These benefits are analogous to the classic
justification for privatizing many traditionally public functions, the
ability to provide the same good or service-in this case compliance
with government regulations-at a lower or cost or to provide a better
good or service at the same cost.30
Other models have included the possibility of remediation as an
element of self-policing and have found that the requirement to
remediate a violation can produce additional welfare gains. To be
27 This summary of economic theories of self-policing draws extensively from the more
detailed presentation of economic models of self-policing in Sarah L. Stafford, Self-Policing in a
Targeted Enforcement Regime, 74 S. EcON. J. 934 (2008). Most of these models are framed in

the context of environmental regulations, but they can be applied more generally to other
regulatory programs.
28 Throughout this Article, I assume implicitly that regulation itself is in the public interest,
and thus, an increase in compliance with regulations will increase overall welfare. If regulation is
misguided or if regulatory officials have been captured by special interests, regulation may not be
beneficial for society in practice, and thus, increasing compliance may not increase overall
welfare. In such cases, the problem is the underlying regulation, not the form of the enforcement
regime.
29 For example, Kaplow and Shavell present a theoretical model where regulated entities
deliberately choose whether or not to comply and are subject to a positive probability of
inspection (and thus detection of violations if the entity has chosen not to comply). Kaplow and
Shavell, supra note 22, at 585. The introduction of a self-policing regime in which entities that
self-police receive a fine equal to the probability of inspection multiplied by the fine for detected
violations induces some entities to self-police, but does not adversely affect deterrence. Id. at
588. Self-policing thus increases welfare because enforcement effort is reduced as self-policers
need not be inspected. Id. Moreover, Kaplow and Shavell show that if individuals are riskaverse rather than risk-neutral, self-policing can lead to welfare improvements through the
reduction of risk. Id. at 796.
30 In general, these models do not assume that self-audits are less costly than government
audits. If that were the case, an additional benefit might be that the overall costs of auditing
decrease, although that would depend on the assumptions and parameters of the model, as the
total amount of auditing is likely to increase under self-policing.
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precise, if a self-policing policy requires entities to remediate their selfreported violations, self-policing can also increase welfare because selfdisclosed violations are remediated more quickly than violations
discovered by regulators, and more violations will ultimately be
remediated. 3 1 Additionally, to the extent that regulated entities that
choose to violate regulations also engage in activities to conceal their
violations, self-policing can increase overall welfare by reducing such
activities.32

Of course, self-policing could have negative effects as well. Given
the ability to self-police (and the inducements for doing so), some
regulated entities may reduce their initial level of investment in
compliance. 33 Moreover, policies that encourage self-policing can lead
to duplication of effort (i.e., self-auditing by regulated entities and
inspections by regulatory authorities) and thus be inefficient.34 If
regulators decrease enforcement efforts at regulated entities that selfpolice, entities could use self-disclosures as "red herrings," notifying
regulators of small violations while concealing more significant
violations.3 5 Additionally, if regulators decrease future enforcement as
a reward for a self-disclosed violation, entities may also decrease
investments in compliance in the future. 36
For regulations that apply to organizations (rather than regulations
that apply to individuals), there is one additional rationale for allowing
self-policing. Organizations subject to regulation must deal with the
classic principal-agent problem: It is ultimately the organization's
employees who determine the organization's compliance status and the
31 For example, the model of self-policing presented in Robert Innes, Remediation and SelfReporting in Optimal Law Enforcement, 72 J. PUB. ECON. 379 (1999), assumes that regulated

entities make a choice as to how much to invest in compliance, with the probability of a violation
harm inversely related to the level of investment. If a violation occurs, the regulated entity can
choose whether or not to remediate the harm. If regulators set the fine associated with selfpolicing at an appropriate level (i.e., so that the cost of remediation and the reduced fine is equal
to the expected penalty and expected remediation cost), entities will self-police. Overall, the level
of remediation will increase because self-policers remediate with certainty whereas nondisclosers only remediate when caught.
32 See, e.g., Robert Innes, Violator Avoidance Activities and Self-Reporting in Optimal Law

Enforcement, 17 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 239 (2001).
33 The possibility for such an effect has been demonstrated in a wide variety of models. See,
e.g., Anthony G. Heyes, Cutting Environmental Penalties to Protect the Environment, 60 J. PUB.
ECON. 251 (1996); Robert Innes, Self-Policing and Optimal Law Enforcement When Violator

Remediation is Valuable, 107 J. POL. ECON. 1305 (1999); Stafford, supra note 27.
34 This potential effect is demonstrated by the model developed by Lana Friesen, The Social
Welfare Implications of Industry Self-Auditing, 51 J. ENvTL. ECON. & MGMT. 280, 290-92

(2006).
35 The use of the term "red herring" for this type of strategic disclosure-i.e., only partially
disclosing an entity's violations-was introduced by Alexander Pfaff & Chris William
Sanchirico, Big Field, Small Potatoes: An Empirical Assessment ofEPA's Self-Audit Policy, 23 J.

POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 415, 426-27 (2004).
36 The potential for self-policing to have dynamic effects on compliance is explained in
Stafford, supra note 27.
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organization has only imperfect means to induce the employees to act in
accordance with the organization's wishes.37 Under strict vicarious
liability, organizations are liable for all actions of their employees.
However, as demonstrated by Jennifer Arlen, strict vicarious liability
cannot induce organizations to both set optimal activity level and
optimal levels of self-policing. 38 Allowing for self-policing within a
strict vicarious liability regime does provide stronger (although
potentially still sub-optimal) incentives for corporate policing of
employee actions. 39
All of the models described in this Part are sensitive to the various
assumptions they employ and do not tell us what actually happens in the
real world when an agency adopts a self-policing policy. Still, the
models suggest that, depending on how a self-policing policy is
structured, self-policing can produce significant benefits, both by
increasing compliance with regulations and reducing the cost of
enforcement.
III.

CASE STUDY: EPA's SELF-POLICING REGIME, THE "AUDIT POLICY"

A.

Description of the Audit Policy

EPA's self-policing policy, known informally as the "Audit
Policy," was issued in December 1995.40 Since the mid 1980s, EPA
37 While the economic models of self-policing discussed above do not explicitly model this
principal-agent relationship, there are a number of models that assume that compliance is, at least
in part, exogenous. E.g., Friesen, supra note 34; Alexander S.P. Pfaff & Chris William
Sanchirico, Environmental Self-Auditing: Setting the Proper Incentives for Discovery and
Correction of Environmental Harm, 16 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 189 (2000); Stafford, supra note 27.

Such models can be viewed as representing the classic principal-agent problem between
organization and employees vis-A-vis compliance activities in that the organization does not have
the ability to ensure full compliance itself.
38 See Arlen, supra note 20, at 836-42, for a discussion of the "perverse incentives" strict
vicarious liability provides for self-policing efforts (which Arlen refers to as corporate
enforcement costs) because self-policing will, in addition to deterring violations by employees,
increase the probability that an organization's violations are detected, thus increasing the
organization's expected liability. Also, see id. at 847-48 for a discussion of the inability of strict
liability to induce optimal levels of both activity and self-policing efforts.
39 See Jennifer Arlen & Reinier Kraakman, Controlling CorporateMisconduct: An Analysis

of Corporate Liability Regimes, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 687, 694 (1997) ("Duty-based liability is
generally better able to induce firms to undertake optimal policing measures such as monitoring,
investigating, and reporting."); id. at 690 (defining a duty-based regime as one similar to that of
the EPA which "immunize[s] firms from liability for internally detected environmental violations
that firms disclose and correct").
40 Incentives for Self-Policing: Discovery, Disclosure, Correction, and Prevention of
Violations-Final Policy Statement, 60 Fed. Reg. 66,706 (Dec. 22, 1995). Minor revisions to the
policy were issued under Incentives for Self-Policing: Discovery, Disclosure, Correction, and
Prevention of Violations-Final Policy Statement, -65 Fed. Reg. 19,618 (Apr. 11, 2000)
[hereinafter Audit Policy].
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had been working to encourage regulated entities to adopt effective
environmental auditing practices, as the Agency believed that
environmental auditing could significantly improve environmental
performance. 4 1 Initially, EPA tried to encourage environmental audits
by suggesting that EPA would take auditing efforts into account when
assessing violations, "particularly when a regulated entity promptly
reports violations or compliance data which otherwise not required to be
recorded or reported to EPA." 42 As the policy evolved, the rewards for
self-disclosures became more explicit, and the requirement that
disclosures arise from an environmental audit were softened. The final
policy that emerged is a self-policing policy rather than a policy on
environmental auditing per se, but it is commonly referred to as the
Audit Policy because EPA's initial objective was to encourage
environmental auditing. Additionally, the Audit Policy is a policy
rather than a formal rule. 43
Under the Audit Policy, any entity that voluntarily identifies,
discloses, and corrects violations of environmental regulations is
eligible for a reduction in the punitive penalties associated with those
violations.44 To be eligible for a complete waiver of punitive penalties
the self-disclosure must meet nine conditionS45:
Systematic discovery: Discovery must either take place
during an environmental audit or during a selfevaluation that is part of a due diligence program.

41 Interim Guidance on Environmental Auditing Policy Statement, 50 Fed. Reg. 46,504 (Nov.
8, 1985) [hereinafter Interim Guidance]. This guidance defines environmental auditing as
follows:
[A] systematic, documented, periodic and objective review by regulated entities of
facility operations and practices related to meeting environmental requirements.
Audits can be designed to accomplish any or all of the following: Verify compliance
with environmental requirements; evaluate the effectiveness of environmental
management systems already in place; or assess risks from regulated and unregulated
materials and practices.
Id EPA's belief that environmental auditing would be beneficial was based primarily on
anecdotal evidence. See, e.g., U.S. EPA, EPA/CMA ROOT CAUSE ANALYSIS PILOT PROJECT: AN
INDUSTRY SURVEY (1999) (presenting results of a study in which many respondents identified
the use of self-audits or third party audits as an important method for improving compliance).
42 Interim Guidance, supra note 41, at 46,506.
43 The Policy states:

The Policy is not final agency action and is intended as guidance. This Policy is not
intended, nor can it be relied upon, to create any rights enforceable by any party in
litigation with the United States. As with the 1995 Audit Policy, EPA may decide to
follow guidance provided in this document or to act at variance with it based on its
analysis of the specific facts presented. This Policy may be revised without public
notice to reflect changes in EPA's approach to providing incentives for self-policing by
regulated entities, or to clarify and update text.
Audit Policy, supra note 40, at 19,627.
44 Id. at 66,711.
45 Id.

OUTSOURCING ENFORCEMENT
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Voluntary discovery: The process though which the
violation is discovered cannot be required by federal,
state or local authorities and cannot be required by
statute, regulation, permit or consent agreement.
* Prompt disclosure: Violations must be disclosed within
twenty-one days of discovery.
* Independent discovery and disclosure: The disclosure
cannot be made after an inspection or investigation has
been announced or notice of a suit has been given.
* Correction and remediation: Any harm from the
violation must be remediated and the violation must be
corrected within sixty days of the date of discovery
unless technological issues are a factor.
* No recurrence: The facility must identify why the
violation occurred and take steps to ensure that it will
not recur.
* No repeat violations: The same or a closely related
violation cannot have occurred within the past three
years at the facility, or within the past five years at
other facilities owned by the same parent organization.
* Not excluded: No serious harm or imminent
endangerment to human health and the environment
can have occurred as a result of the violation and the
violation cannot have been a violation of an order,
consent agreement, or plea agreement.
* Cooperation: The facility must cooperate with EPA,
including providing all requested documents.
If the disclosure meets all but the first condition, the punitive
penalty is reduced by seventy-five percent, rather than one-hundred
percent. 46 Additionally, as long as no actual harm has occurred, EPA
will not recommend criminal prosecution of the regulated entity unless
EPA determines that the violation is part of a pattern or practice that
demonstrates or involves "(i) [a] prevalent management philosophy or
practice that conceals or condones environmental violations; or (ii)
[h]igh-level corporate officials' or managers' conscious involvement in,
or willful blindness to, violations of Federal environmental law." 47 The
conditions for a self-disclosed violation to be eligible for penalty
reductions are designed to ensure that the policy increases overall
compliance and does not undermine the existing enforcement regime.
It is important to note that the regulated entity cannot receive any
reduction in penalties that are based on the economic benefit gained
from noncompliance, only a reduction in penalties that are punitive in
46 Id.

47 Id. This applies only to the regulated entity, not to any managers or employees.
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nature. 48 For example, if a facility neglects to sample a particular waste
stream for several months and discovers this violation through an
environmental audit, assuming the violation meets all of the conditions
above, the facility would receive a complete reduction in the punitive
portion of the penalty, but would continue to owe a penalty equal to the
savings it received from not having conducted those samples. This
requirement is necessary to ensure that regulated entities have no
incentive to deliberately violate and then self-police. In the example
above, there would be no benefit to deliberately not sampling and then
self-policing if the regulated entity has to pay the cost of sampling after
disclosure.
During the development of the Audit Policy, EPA repeatedly
sought comments from the regulated community. One commenter on
an early version of the policy suggested that EPA should commit to
taking audits into account when assessing enforcement actions. In
response, EPA stated that agreeing to forgo inspections or reduce
enforcement responses is "fraught with legal and policy obstacles." 49
However EPA also noted that, because effective audit programs should
improve compliance, facilities that audit should have improved
environmental performance, which is likely to be considered in setting
inspection priorities. Such language is consistent with statements on
EPA's website that when facilities self-police, it can render "formal
EPA investigations and enforcement actions unnecessary."5 0 This
statement implies that, as well as rewarding self-policers with reduced
penalties, EPA's Audit Policy may provide additional incentives in the
form of reduced enforcement.
Throughout the development of the Audit Policy, EPA consistently
refused to grant privileges to environmental audits, as that would be
"counter to efforts to open up environmental decision making and
encourage public participation." 5 Additionally, EPA was concerned
that environmental audit privileges could be misused to "shield bad
actors or to frustrate access to crucial factual information." 52 However,
EPA has repeatedly stated that its long-standing practice is to not
request copies of regulated entities' voluntary audit reports. 53

48 Id at

66,712.
49 See EPA Final Policy Statement, 51 Fed. Reg. 25,004, at 25,004 (July 9, 1986).
50 See Compliance Incentives and Auditing, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/compliance/incentives/

auditing/index.html (last visited June 19, 2011).
51 Voluntary Environmental Self-Policing and Self-Disclosure Interim Policy Statement, 60
Fed. Reg. 16,875, at 16,878 (Apr. 3, 1995).
52 Id

53 Audit Policy, supra note 40, at 66,711.
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Analysis of the Audit Policy

General Information of the Use of the Audit Policy

EPA consistently publicizes the Audit Policy as one of its
successful, innovative approaches to compliance. 54 To get a sense of
the role the Audit Policy plays in EPA's overall enforcement regime,
there are over one million entities that are subject to EPA regulation. 55
In 2009, federal and state regulators conducted about 20,000 regulatory
inspections and evaluations, wrote about 3500 administrative
compliance and penalty orders, made about 280 civil judicial referrals,
and opened just under 400 criminal cases. During this same time frame,
there were approximately 1200 self-disclosures. 56 Of course, there
could be many more entities that "self-policed," but found themselves to
be in complete compliance and thus had nothing to disclose.57
Two researchers, Alexander Pfaff and Chris Sanchirico, conducted
an analysis of disclosures made under the Audit Policy from 1994 to
1999 and found that the majority of disclosed violations were reporting
and recordkeeping violations.58 I found a similar result when I
conducted an analysis of disclosures made between 1994 and early
2002.59 Although the initial reaction might be to think that a self-

54 For example, in the introduction to EPA's Fiscal Year 2002 Enforcement and Compliance
Assurance Report, Assistant Administrator John Peter Suarez included the 26% increase in
companies' self-reporting violations as one of the highlights of the year. EPA, ENVIRONMENTAL
RESULTS THROUGH SMART ENFORCEMENT: FISCAL YEAR 2002 ENFORCEMENT AND
(2002),
REPORT
4
ASSURANCE
ACCOMPLISHMENTS
COMPLIANCE

http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/reports/accomplishments/oeca/fy02accomplishment.pd
f. An EPA Strategic Plan listed self-policing as one of four key components of its enforcement
plan.

EPA, 2006-2011 EPA STRATEGIC PLAN: CHARTING OUR COURSE (2006), available at

http://www.epa.gov/planandbudget/archive.html.
55 Data on regulated facilities were compiled by author using EPA's Envirofacts Database.
56 Disclosure and inspection data from Compliance and Enforcement Annual Results 2009

Fiscal Year, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/reports/endofyearleoy2009/
2009numbers.html (last updated Nov. 9, 2010).
57 Disclosing that you are in compliance is not an option under the Audit Policy, and from a
theoretical standpoint, it probably should not be. If such disclosures do not change future
enforcement behavior, then making them only increases the costs of implementing the policy, as
the disclosures have to be recorded. If there were a reward for making such disclosures (such as
reduced future enforcement), then EPA would need to institute a process to verify those
disclosures (otherwise, entities would falsely disclose compliance in order to receive the reward).
There is no reason to expect that the verification process would be less resource-intensive than a
traditional enforcement inspection, and thus it is difficult to construct a situation in which such a
regime would increase overall compliance relative to a traditional enforcement regime.
58 See Pfaff& Sanchirico, supra note 35.
59 The analysis covered the 236 disclosures that were entered into EPA's Audit Docket (HQOECA-C-94-01). The Audit Docket initially served as a repository for all disclosures made
under the Audit Policy. Around 1998, EPA stopped placing all disclosures in the Audit Docket,
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policing policy that only results in the disclosure of minor violations
cannot be effective, that is not necessarily the case. One of the primary
reasons for having an enforcement policy is to deter regulated entities
from violating regulations. However, potential violators will only be
deterred by the threat of punishment if the decision to violate is based
on rational comparison of the cost of compliance compared to the
expected cost of violation. If regulated entities violate not because they
are "rational violators," but rather because they are mistaken or
confused about how to comply, enforcement will not deter them from
violation. 60 If such entities can be brought into compliance by selfpolicing, enforcement resources can be redirected away from confused
violators toward rational violators, increasing the overall level of
deterrence without increasing enforcement resources. One may also
think that confused violators are much more likely to make small
mistakes such as record-keeping or reporting errors. If this is the case,
then one should not be surprised at the types of violations that are being
reported.
Under the Audit Policy, EPA does give self-disclosers a significant
penalty reduction. During the 2001 to 2005 period, over two-thirds of
all disclosures resulted in a complete waiver of all penalties. 61 In
addition, the likelihood of a regulatory inspection decreases
significantly following a self-disclosure. The results of an analysis I
conducted on self-disclosures and inspections at facilities subject to
EPA's hazardous waste regulations found that, on average, a selfdisclosure in 2001 from a facility regulated under EPA's hazardous
waste program reduces the probability of inspection in 2002 by fourfifths. 62
2.

Effect on Compliance and Enforcement

From the beginning of its development, opponents of the Audit
Policy argued that it would have a detrimental effect on the environment
because it protected polluters from punishment and decreased the
incentives for entities to comply with regulations. To assess the overall
and by early 2002 EPA was no longer using the Audit Docket at all. Thus, the 236 disclosures in
the docket may not be a representative sample.
60 A more detailed discussion on these ideas is provided in Sarah L. Stafford, Rational or
Confused Polluters? Evidence from Hazardous Waste Compliance, 5 B.E. J. EcoN. ANALYSIS &
POL'Y, no. 1, Art. 21 (2006), available at http://www.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=1 623&context-bejeap.
61 Calculations made by author using information from EPA's database of voluntary
disclosures for Fiscal Years 2001 to 2005 obtained under a Freedom of Information Act request.
62 Sarah L. Stafford, Should You Turn Yourselfln? The Consequences ofEnvironmental Self-

Policing, 26 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 305 (2007).
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effect the Audit Policy had on compliance, I conducted an analysis of
the effect of the Audit Policy on compliance with hazardous waste
regulations. 63 The analysis uses data on detected hazardous waste
violations and EPA enforcement actions to determine statistically if
there has been an underlying change in the compliance behavior of
regulated entities. The results provide little evidence to support the
theory that compliance has decreased as a result of the Audit Policy.
According to the results of my study, the federal Audit Policy has had
no measurable effect on compliance behavior while state self-policing
policies and state audit privilege legislation have decreased the
probability of violation.64 Interestingly, state legislation that provides
complete penalty immunity for self-disclosed violations increases the
probability of a violation. In this study, I also examined inspection
before and after the imposition of the Audit Policy.
I also conducted a second study using a different data set to
examine the consequences of self-policing for facilities that selfdisclosed under the Audit Policy. 6 5 The primary focus of this analysis
was to examine the effect that a self-disclosure has on future inspections
to determine whether self-policers were being rewarded with a decrease
in future enforcement. As discussed above, I did find that self-policers
are rewarded with a lower probability of enforcement following a
disclosure. One implication of this finding is that the Audit Policy may
induce entities to strategically disclose violations in order to obtain the
advantage of the "enforcement holiday" that follows a disclosure.
Michael Toffel and Jodi Short examine the effect of the Audit
Policy on firm compliance with Clean Air Act regulations, rather than
hazardous waste regulations, and find similar results. 66 Their analysis
concludes that self-disclosers have lower levels of abnormal releases
and higher compliance rates in the five years following their disclosure.
They also find that regulators grant "inspection holidays" to facilities
that self-police.

63 See Sarah Stafford, Does Self-Policing Help the Environment? EPA's Audit Policy and
Hazardous Waste Compliance, 6 VT. J. ENvTL. L. 14 (2005). The analysis only considers

compliance with hazardous waste regulations because the separate programs that regulate air,
water, toxic materials, and hazardous waste all maintain their own enforcement authority and it is
very difficult to combine data across the various enforcement programs.
6 In addition to the federal Audit Policy, a number of states have passed their own selfpolicing policies as well as immunity and privilege legislation for environmental audits. The
state policies are discussed in more detail in Sarah L. Stafford, State Adoption of Environmental
Audit Initiatives, 24 CONTEMP. ECON. POL'Y 172 (2006).
65 See Stafford, supra note 62.
66 Michael W. Toffel & Jodi L. Short, Coming, Clean and Cleaning Up: Is Voluntary SelfNo. 08-098,
Reporting a Signal of Effective Self-Policing? 4-5 (Harv. Bus. Sch. Working Paper
7

2010), available at http://www.hbs.edu/research/facpubs/workingpapers/papers0
098.

8.html#wpO8-
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A recent study conducted by Santiago Guerrero and Robert Innes
also provides some interesting evidence on the effect of self-policing on
environmental performance. 67 This study examines the effect of state
self-policing policies and environmental audit legislation (rather than
EPA's Audit Policy) on changes in toxic emission levels (rather than
violations of environmental regulations). 68 Additionally, while the
study considers overall levels of toxic emissions, it only examines
enforcement efforts related to the Clean Air Act, not overall
enforcement efforts. Similar to the results I found in my study of
hazardous waste compliance, their analysis shows that state selfpolicing policies and audit privilege legislation lead to lower levels of
toxic emissions, while legislation that provides complete immunity from
state penalties leads to increases in toxic emissions. Innes and Guerrero
also find that state self-policing and privilege protections lead to
reduced rates of Clean Air Act inspection, while complete immunity
spurs increased inspection levels. While these results are not specific to
EPA's self-policing policy, they do suggest that the blanket provision of
complete immunity (something that EPA's Audit Policy does not do) is
not beneficial to the environment. The authors speculate that complete
immunity reduces entities' incentive to avoid environmental violations
in the first place, thereby increasing overall pollution. Moreover, the
results suggest that regulators must increase their monitoring of
regulated entities to respond to the reduced incentives.
Taken together, these studies indicate that EPA's Audit Policy
increases compliance and performance, or at a minimum, does not
decrease it. Given that overall environmental enforcement resources
decreased over the time frame of these analyses, 69 there is thus
reasonable evidence that the efficiency of EPA's enforcement program
has increased under the Audit Policy.

67 See Santiago Guerrero & Robert Innes, Statutory Rewards to Environmental Self-Auditing:
Do They Reduce Pollution and Save Regulatory Costs? Evide

fi=
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(2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://rdinnes.com/wp-content/uploads/2008/05/
santiagopaper5.pdf.
68 While decreases in toxic emissions certainly affect environmental quality, they are not
necessarily indicative of higher levels of compliance, as regulated entities can emit toxic
materials in full compliance with environmental regulations.
69 See Wayne B. Gray & Jay P. Shimshack, The Effectiveness ofEnvironmental Monitoring
and Enforcement: A Review of the Empirical Evidence, 5 REV. ENVTL. ECON. & POL'Y
(forthcoming
2011)
(manuscript
at
5
fig.
1),
available
at
http://reep.oxfordjoumals.org/content/early/2011/05/13/reep.reqOl7.full.pdf+html
(documenting
the decrease in EPA enforcement resources from 1994 to 2010).
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Potential "Outsourcing Concerns"

Even though EPA's analyses show that self-policing increases
compliance, and thus by assumption overall welfare, 70 there could still
be good reason to reject it. Part II presented four potential concerns
about outsourcing that have been identified by various scholars of the
law and public policy. This subpart examines and evaluates those
possible objections to self-policing, drawing on the content of EPA's
Audit Policy and the experience with its operation.
a.

Accountability

The first issue is accountability, more specifically the potential loss
in accountability that can occur when government functions are
transferred to private agents. Ideally, if there were full accountability,
public actions would be consistent with public interest, although in
practice accountability means that the public knows what actions are
being taken and can effect changes in those actions if they are not
consistent with the preferences of the public. 7 1 Thus, accountability is
closely tied to the idea of transparency-for the public to hold someone
accountable, they must first know what that individual has done.
How transparent is the Audit Policy? All disclosures which are
granted relief under the Audit Policy are made publicly available after
the disclosure has been settled, as well as the terms of the settlement
(i.e., any penalty reductions). 72 Initially, disclosures were entered into
the Audit Policy docket, although this practice is no longer being used
and no new cases have been added into the docket since early 2002.73
EPA does provide data on the total number of disclosures each year in
an annual report, but to obtain data on individual disclosures, one must
submit a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request. 74 Thus, one
might fear that the accountability of EPA's enforcement system is
70 See supra note 28 (discussing the relationship between compliance and overall welfare).
71 See DONAHUE, supra note 4, at 23-24 ("Accountability means that government action
accords with the will of the people it represents.... Yet, even assuming the best intentions on
the part of public decision-makers, making that principle effective in collective choice is an
elusive ideal.").
72 Audit Policy, supra note 40, at 19,627 ("EPA will make publicly available the terms and
conditions of any compliance agreement reached under this Policy, including the nature of the
violation, the remedy, and the schedule for returning to compliance.").
73 Examination of EPA Docket HQ-OECA-C-94-01 by author, conducted in 2004.
74 For the annual aggregate numbers, see the "Numbers at a Glance" Section of the EPA's
Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assistance reports on Annual Results, available at
http://www.epa.gov/compliance/data/results/annuallindex.html (last visited June 19, 2011).
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reduced by the Audit Policy. However, enforcement by EPA is not
necessarily any more transparent than the Audit Policy. Aggregate
information on inspections and violations are provided each year in the
same annual report that provides data on the number of disclosures.75
Some data on a particular regulated entity's compliance and
enforcement status is available from a database available on EPA's
website, but to obtain complete data on an entity's compliance history
or a list of entities that had been inspected or prosecuted for violation of
a particular environmental regulation, one would most likely have to file
a FOIA request. 76
Even if there were additional transparency with respect to the
Audit Policy (or for that matter enforcement in general), enforcement is
much less accountable than other parts of the public policy process as
there is no formal role for public participation in the development or
implementation of an enforcement protocol.n Since EPA lacks the
resources to inspect all regulated entities or even to pursue cases against
all those that are found in violation, there is significant agency
discretion to determine how to deploy enforcement resources.78
Moreover, in those cases that are pursued, parties may settle or enter
into consent decrees, negotiating the terms of their ultimate
"compliance" with the regulations with little to no public input into the
process. Perhaps as a response to this relative lack of accountability in
enforcement, one feature of most environmental statutes is a private
right of action for individuals (or groups) to sue regulated entities for
violations of the regulations. 79
This mechanism for direct
accountability to the community is not affected by the self-policing
policy. 80

75 See id.
76 See Enforcement and Compliance History Online (ECHO), EPA, http://www.epa-

echo.gov/echo (last updated May 11, 2011). ECHO provides compliance and enforcement data
for approximately 800,000 regulated facilities nationwide. The data set includes inspection,
violation, enforcement action, informal enforcement action, and penalty information about
facilities for a three-year window.
77 Unlike the rulemaking process, there is no formal public participation in the development
or implementation of an enforcement protocol. Additionally, "courts are reluctant to review the
exercise of enforcement discretion." See Freeman,supra note 8, at 648 n.43 1.
78 For example, Heckler v. Chaney held that agency decisions not to bring an enforcement
action are generally "committed to agency discretion by law" and are thus not reviewable by a
court under the Administrative Procedures Act. 470 U.S. 821, 826 (1985).
79 See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (2006); Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(1)
(2006); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (2006). However,
the ability to bring private suits is only a partial substitute for what the EPA does because the
EPA can refer cases to the Department of Justice for criminal enforcement.
80 See Timothy T. Jones et al., Environmental Compliance Audits: The Arkansas Experience,

21 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REv. 191, 240 (1999) (noting that citizen suits are not bound by the
enforcement discretion EPA has articulated in its audit policies).
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Given the high level of agency discretion, the low level of
accountability in EPA's public enforcement regime and the lack of any
evidence that the Audit Policy has resulted in a significant decrease in
accountability, I do not think that the Audit Policy can be opposed on
accountability grounds.
b.

Inherently Governmental Functions

A second concern over outsourcing is the outsourcing of inherently
governmental functions. At first glance, enforcement of regulations
may not appear to be an inherently governmental function. 8' In fact,
enforcement of some types of regulations is commonly outsourced.
According to a 2007 survey of local governments, approximately 15%
of those surveyed contract out tax collection, 8% contract out public
works inspections and enforcement, and 4% contract out traffic control
and parking enforcement. 82 With respect to the enforcement of
environmental regulations, however, it is more difficult to make the
case that it is clearly not an inherently governmental function.
There is general agreement that policy decisions and the making of
regulation are inherently governmental. 83
But the regulations
themselves are not realized by the act of promulgation; the real
consequence of a regulation depends not only on the promulgated
language, but also on the implementation and enforcement of that
regulation.84 To the extent that enforcement is central to ultimately
determining the import of a regulation,85 enforcement could be seen as
an indirect "inherently governmental activity."
Although the Audit Policy does reduce penalties for self-disclosed
violations, EPA maintains ultimate discretion as to final penalties, what
must be done to remediate the violation, and so forth, and thus
determines the ultimate import of the regulations, even with respect to
81 Obviously, the mere fact that something was once performed by government or is usually
performed by government does not mean that it is inherently a governmental function.
82 INT'L CITY-CNTY. MGMT. ASS'N (ICMA), PROFILE OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT SERVICE
available
at
http://icma.org/en/results/
CHOICES
3-5
(2007),
DELIVERY
surveying/surveyresearch/surveyresults.
83 See VERKUIL, supra note 2, at 45 n.160 ('We regard it as axiomatic that policy decisions

must be made by full-time Government officials clearly responsible to the President and
Congress."' (quoting EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON
GOVERNMENT CONTRACTING FOR RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT (1962))); see also Freeman,
supra note 8, at 563 (explaining that under both the public interest and civic republican theories
of administration, agencies provide acts as "a bulwark against narrow private pressure" and thus
are able to make decisions in the public interest).
84 Freeman, supra note 8, at 572 ("Rules develop meaning, however, only through the fluid
processes of design, implementation, enforcement, and negotiation.").
85 Id. at 661 ("Only at the enforcement stage do policy choices made by Congress and
interpreted by agencies through regulations translate into substantive requirements.").
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firms that choose to "turn themselves in." 86 Thus, even though parts of
the enforcement process have been outsourced, EPA does continue to
determine the ultimate import of the regulations. Moreover, the Audit
Policy plays a limited role in EPA's overall enforcement regime. As
noted above, for every self-disclosure of a violation, over sixteen
federal or state regulatory inspections are conducted.87 As a result, it is
hard to make a case for opposing the Audit Policy based on the
outsourcing of an inherently governmental function.
c.

Reduced Governmental Capacity

The third issue concerns reduced governmental capacity. Any
information or experience gained during the conduct of an outsourced
function will accrue to private parties. Some information or experience
may be transferred from the private party to the agency, but it may be
difficult or impossible to write contracts to induce complete
transmission of information. The Audit Policy is structured in a way
that should mitigate this concern, as the process for reporting a selfpoliced violation ensures that information is transferred to regulators as
a condition for receiving a penalty reduction. Moreover, to the extent
that self-disclosures increase the total number of violations of which
EPA is aware, EPA's overall level information will increase.
Additionally, the act of self-policing should provide additional
information to the regulated entity so that the entity can make changes
to its operation. Thus, any loss in information to EPA is likely to be
small, and there is a reasonable expectation that EPA could actually
gain information under self-policing. Finally, regulated entities are
likely to gain information that will provide public benefits (through
increased environmental performance) to offset any loss in experience
to EPA.
d.

Corruption

The final concern discussed in Part II was the potential for
outsourcing to increase corruption. While that is a valid concern in
situations where there is a revolving door between agencies and private
entities seeking to obtain agency contracts, the Audit Policy is unlikely
to increase the potential for or risks from corruption. Unlike many
privatization efforts, the Audit Policy outsources to regulated entities
86 Audit Policy, supra note 40, at 19,627.
87 Calculation based on the 1200 self-disclosures and 20,000 regulatory inspections reported
in 2009. See supra note 55.
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themselves, not to outside contractors. This is not to say that the
regulated entities do not have incentives to try to cheat, just that the
Audit Policy does not increase incentives for public employees to
substitute their own personal interests for the public interest.
IV.

OTHER FEDERAL SELF-POLICING REGIMES

Many federal agencies currently incorporate self-policing into their
enforcement programs. While the following subpart does not provide a
complete inventory, it does provide a sense of the venues in which selfpolicing is currently used, and the range of different policies that exist.88
A.

The FederalAviation Administration

The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) established a
voluntary disclosure reporting program (VRDP) in 1990.89 Under this
program, FAA will forego legal enforcement action against air carriers,
repair stations, and aircraft and aircraft equipment manufacturers who
voluntarily disclose violations of FAA requirements for maintenance,
flight operations, drug and alcohol prevention programs, and security
functions that meet the following conditions: 90
* The violation is disclosed immediately once it is
detected and before the Agency learns of it by other
means;
* The violation was inadvertent;
* The violation does not indicate a lack, or reasonable
question, of qualification;
* Immediate action is taken to terminate the conduct that
resulted in the violation; and

88 Other authors have also compiled lists of federal self-policing efforts, but to my
knowledge, no other author has analyzed these policies with respect to privatization concerns.
See John S. Moot, Compliance Programs, Penalty Mitigation and the FERC, 29 ENERGY L.J.,

547 (2008), for a selective list of policies, and Christopher A. Wray & Robert K. Hur, Corporate
Criminal Prosecution in a Post-Enron World: The Thompson Memo in Theory and Practice, 43

AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1095 (2006) for a more exhaustive list (although the focus is on corporate
enforcement not self-policing and thus includes policies that do not include self-policing or selfdisclosure).
89 U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-04-046, AVIATION SAFETY: BETTER
MANAGEMENT CONTROLS ARE NEEDED TO IMPROVE FAA's SAFETY ENFORCEMENT AND

COMPLIANCE EFFORTS (2004) [hereinafter GAO FAA]. The current version of the policy is
delineated in FAA Advisory Circular No. 00-58B, Voluntary Disclosure Reporting Program (Apr.
29, 2009) [hereinafter AC 00-058B].
90 See AC 00-058B, supra note 89, § 7(b).
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*

The regulated entity has developed or is developing a
comprehensive solution to correct the violation that is
satisfactory to the FAA.
Voluntary disclosures that meet these criteria receive only a
warning or "Letter of Correction" rather than any other type of
enforcement action (including civil penalties or certificate
suspension). 91 Disclosed violations that meet the above criteria are also
protected from public release. 92
According to a Governmental Accountability Office (GAO) report,
over 2000 self-disclosures are filed annually, relative to approximately
15,000 total enforcement actions. 93 To date there has not been any
formal evaluation of the VRDP, so there is no empirical evidence of its
effect on overall compliance. However, critics of FAA's enforcement
policy believe that the VRDP allows regulated entities to avoid formal
enforcement actions, 94 and in April of 2008 the House Committee on
Transportation and Infrastructure held a hearing entitled "Critical
Lapses in FAA Safety Oversight of Airlines: Abuses of Regulatory
'Partnership Programs" 95 to determine the extent to which the VRDP
and other enforcement programs were circumventing formal
enforcement of FAA regulations. The FAA contends that the VRDP
program is necessary to increase agency awareness of operational safety
issues and that it has helped to identify a number of important areas to
focus on such as pilot and controller communications and runway
incursions. 96 Thus, there may be long-term benefits from the VRDP
that cannot be easily measured.
In addition to concerns that the VRDP may not be increasing
overall compliance, it also appears to raise more outsourcing concerns
With respect to transparency and
than EPA's Audit Policy.
accountability, under FAA policy, disclosures are explicitly exempted
from FOIA queries. Thus, one could argue that transparency and
accountability are significantly reduced by this policy. Additionally, if
the VRDP does allow regulated entities to circumvent FAA's formal

91 Critical Lapses in FAA Safety Oversight of Airlines: Abuses of Regulatory "Partnership
Programs": HearingBefore the H. Comm. on Transp. and Infrastructure, 110th Cong. 2 (2008)

[hereinafter Critical Lapses] (statement of Nicholas A. Sabatini, Assoc. Admin. for Aviation
Safety).
92 See AC 00-058B, supra note 89, § 13, at 6.
93 See GAO FAA, supra note 89, at 12-13 (annual self-disclosures); id. at 14-15 (annual
enforcement actions).
94 See, e.g., James Hohmann, FAA Chief Defends Airlines' Voluntary Self-Policing, L.A.

TIMES, Apr. 18, 2008, at A13; John Hughes, Northwest's "Systemic" Directives Compliance
Lapses EscapedFAA, U.S. Says, BLOOMBERG, July 23, 2010, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/

2010-07-23/northwest-air-s-systemic-compliance-lapses-escaped-regulator-u-s-says.html.
95 See CriticalLapses, supra note 9 1.
96 GAO FAA, supra note 89, at 25.
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enforcement program, it would make concerns about outsourcing
inherently governmental functions more relevant.
B.

The Departmentof Energy, Office of Health,
Safety, and Security

The Department of Energy's (DOE) Office of Health, Safety, and
Security has had a self-policing policy since 1993.97 Contractors who
operate DOE nuclear facilities can receive up to 100% penalty
mitigation for self-disclosed violations of nuclear safety, worker safety
and health, and classified information security regulations depending on
the circumstances under which they self-disclose, the nature of the
violations, and the extent to which the violation is corrected. 98
Although the DOE policy does not explicitly require disclosures to meet
specific conditions, the criteria by which the level of penalty reduction
is determined echo many of the conditions of EPA's Audit Policy. For
example, consideration is given to 99:
* Whether prior opportunities existed to discover the
violation;
* The extent to which proper contractor controls should
have identified or prevented the violation;
* Whether discovery of the violation resulted from a
contractor's self-monitoring activity;
* The extent of DOE involvement in discovering the
violation or in prompting the contractor to identify the
violation;
* The promptness and completeness of any required
report;
* The appropriateness, timeliness and degree of initiative
associated with any corrective action; and
* The comprehensiveness of the corrective action.
97 Procedural Rules for DOE Nuclear Activities, General Statement of Enforcement Policy,
10 C.F.R. pt. 820, app. A (2011) (indicating that the Federal Register Source was published Aug.
17, 1993).
Pursuant to this enforcement philosophy, DOE will provide substantial incentive for
the early self-identification, reporting and prompt correction of problems which
constitute, or could lead to, violations of DOE Nuclear Safety Requirements. Thus,
application of the adjustment factors set forth below may result in no civil penalty
being assessed for violations that are identified, reported, and promptly and effectively
corrected by the DOE contractor.
Id. pt. IX(3)(b).
98 Id. pt. IX(4), (7) (stating that self-policers can receive up to 50% civil penalty mitigation
for self-identified and reported violations and up to 50% mitigation for prompt, comprehensive,
and effective corrective actions).
99 Id. pt. IX(5)(b), (7).
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A GAO report on overall enforcement from the Office of Health,
Safety, and Security found:
The actual number of notices of violations and enforcement letters
levied against contractors for violating DOE's nuclear safety
requirements has been relatively small compared to the number of
self-reported conditions of noncompliance that are entered into the
Noncompliance Tracking System. Our analysis shows that voluntary
entries into the tracking system have averaged around 220 per year
since 1999, and the combined number of notices of violations and
enforcement letters averaged about 12 per year during this time
period. 0 0
Thus, DOE's self-policing policy appears to play a much larger role in
its overall enforcement program than does EPA's Audit Policy.
However, there has not been any formal evaluation or analysis of the
effectiveness of this policy in increasing overall compliance.
With respect to outsourcing concerns, as is the case with EPA's
Audit Policy, DOE's self-policing policy appears to be a complement to
its enforcement policy, not a substitute for it. In terms of accountability,
self-disclosures are entered into a DOE database along with other
agency discovered violations, although some disclosures may not be
10
However, given
serious enough to pass DOE's reporting threshold.o
the nature of the operations at these facilities, it is not clear whether the
public can easily obtain information on disclosures. Of course, this
applies to DOE enforcement as well, so it is unlikely that the selfpolicing actions are much less transparent than government enforcement
actions.
C.

The OccupationalSafety and Health Administration

The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA)
finalized its self-policing policy in 2000.102 Like EPA's Audit Policy,
OSHA chose to implement a policy rather than a formal rule.103 Under
its policy, voluntarily self-disclosed violations that are corrected prior to
any OSHA inspection will not receive a citation, and those violations
100 U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-61, NUCLEAR SAFETY: DEPARTMENT OF
ENERGY NEEDS TO STRENGTHEN ITS INDEPENDENT OVERSIGHT OF NUCLEAR FACILITIES AND
OPERATIONS 33 (2008).
101 However, contractors are still required to track these instances of noncompliance and make
them available to DOE enforcement upon request. See OFFICE OF ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEP'T OF
ENERGY, ENFORCEMENT PROCESS OVERVIEW (2009), available at http://www.hss.doe.gov/
enforce/docs/FinalEPOJune_2009 v4.pdf.
102 Final Policy Concerning the Occupational Safety and Health Administration's Treatment
of Voluntary Employer Safety and Health Self-Audits, 65 Fed. Reg. 46,498 (July 28, 2000)
[hereinafter OSHA Final Policy].
103 Id. at 46,500-01.
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that are self-disclosed but cannot be corrected prior to an inspection are
eligible for a penalty reduction of up to 25%.104 Like EPA, OSHA does
not give audit documents privilege, but does state that it will not
routinely request audit documents. 105
One of the key differences between this policy and the Audit
Policy is that it does not provide any explicit list of conditions that must
be met for immunity or penalty reductions to be granted other than that
the violations must have been discovered in the course of a systematic,
documented, and objective review of the regulated entity.106
Additionally, the policy provides complete immunity for disclosed
violations that are corrected prior to an inspection. Thus, it appears to
be possible for a regulated entity to commit a violation that provides the
entity with some economic benefit, and to pay no penalty at all for such
a violation if it is disclosed and corrected prior to an OSHA inspection.
Because this policy has never been formally analyzed or evaluated, one
can only speculate as to its effect on overall compliance. 0 7 However,
the two differences with the Audit Policy cited above are both
differences that are likely to have a negative effect on compliance.
Theoretical models of self-compliance have noted that providing
complete immunity-particularly not requiring entities to pay a penalty
equivalent to the economic benefit they received from the violationcan lead to higher violations. Also, as noted in Part III.B.2 of this
Article, state environmental self-policing policies that provided
complete immunity have been shown to result in lower levels of
compliance and environmental performance. 0 8
The OSHA policy also raises some outsourcing concerns. With
respect to accountability, the policy makes no provision for making acts
of self-policing public. Another concern is that OSHA enforcement and
penalties are generally acknowledged to be relatively meager-certainly
not at the same level as EPA enforcement and penalties.1 09 Thus, it is
not clear that self-policing is used to complement OSHA enforcement

104 Id. at 46,502-03.

105 Id. pts. 111.3-4, V.C.
106 See generally OSHA Final Policy, supra note 102. This requirement that the discovery be
the result of a systematic, objective review is very similar to the first condition listed in the EPA's
Audit Policy, supranote 40, at 19,625-26.
107 The GAO conducted a study on OSHA's voluntary compliance programs that includes the
self-policing policy. However, the self-policing policy was not separately identified in the report,
nor was there any formal evaluation of the effectiveness of the voluntary compliance. See U.S.
GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-04-378, WORKPLACE SAFETY AND HEALTH: OSHA's
VOLUNTARY COMPLIANCE STRATEGIES SHow PROMISING RESULTS, BUT SHOULD BE FULLY
EVALUATED BEFORE THEY ARE EXPANDED (2004).

108 See Guerrero & Innes, supra note 67; Stafford, supra note 63.
109 See Patricia Ware, OSHA Plans to Launch New Penalty Policy with Higher Fines This
Fall, Barab Says, 40 O.S.H. Rep. (BNA) 726 (Sept. 16, 2010), available at

http://ehscenter.bna.com/PIC2/ehs.nsf/id/BNAP-89CETL.
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rather than be a substitute for it, making concerns that an inherently
governmental function is being outsourced more pertinent.
D.

FederalElectricRegulatory Commission

The Federal Electric Regulatory Commission (FERC) incorporated
self-policing into its enforcement program for electricity transmission
and wholesale sales markets from the program's inception in 2005.110
Under FERC's self-policing policy, the fact that a facility self-reports
can result in up to 100% penalty mitigation.III Like DOE's policy,
FERC does not explicitly require that the disclosure meet specific
conditions, but does say that the level of mitigation depends onl 2:
* The manner in which the violation was discovered;
* The timeliness with which the violation was disclosed;
and
* Steps taken to stop or correct the violation.
FERC provides overall statistics about the number and types of
self-disclosures made from 2006 to 2009, as well as the disposition of
those self-disclosures in its 2009 Enforcement Report, but there has not
been an analysis of the effectiveness of the self-policing program.1 13
FERC's self-policing policy plays a more significant role in overall
110 The Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594, gave FERC new civil
penalty authority. To implement this authority, FERC adopted a new enforcement regime, which
implied that self-policing would be a mitigating factor in determining penalties. See Enforcement
of Statutes, Orders, Rules, and Regulations, 113 FERC 61,068 (2005).
In discussing the factors we will take into account in determining the severity of
penalties to be imposed for violations, we also recognize the importance of
demonstrable compliance and cooperation efforts by utilities, natural gas companies,
and other entities subject to the statutes, orders, rules, and regulations administered by
the Commission. We encourage regulated entities to have comprehensive compliance
programs, to develop a culture of compliance within their organizations, and to selfreport and cooperate with the Commission in the event violations occur.
Id. In 2008, FERC reiterated its commitment to reducing penalties for self-disclosed violations.
See FERC Revised Policy Statement on Enforcement, 123 FERC 61,156 (2008) [hereinafter
FERC, Revised Statement].
I As stated by FERC:
In most cases, self-reported violations have resulted in the matters being closed without
any enforcement action being taken. In the cases where a self-report did result in
enforcement action, the penalties reflected mitigation credit for the self-reporting.
While we do not articulate here the precise amount of mitigation credit that was earned
for self-reporting in our recent enforcement actions, we reiterate that the penalties in
these cases would have been greater absent self-reporting.
FERC Revised Statement, supra note 110, at 62,019.
112 Id.

113 FERC, ADO7-13-002, 2009 REPORT ON ENFORCEMENT (2009) enumerates the number and

types of self-disclosures made from 2006-2009, as well as the disposition of those selfdisclosures, but does not attempt to analyze the effectiveness of the self-policing program. Id. at
8-14.
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enforcement than EPA's policy does. For example, in 2009, there were
122 self-disclosures compared to only ten investigations and thirty-three
audits by public officials.l14
Unlike EPA's policy, there is no statement in FERC's self-policing
policy that self-disclosures will be made available to the public. On the
contrary, FERC's enforcement report states that much of the
enforcement actions the agency takes are "non-public Enforcement
activities, such as self-reported violations and investigations that are
closed without any public enforcement action or civil penalty
assessments." 11 5
Since both FERC enforcement and the self-policing policy are
relatively new phenomena, it is hard to assess whether this instance of
outsourcing is beneficial or not. On the one hand, the policy does seem
to follow EPA's and DOE's policies in many important respects by not
providing blanket immunity, but rather conditioning disclosures.
However, the conditions are very vaguely expressed and there is no
formal mechanism for reporting self-disclosures to the public, raising
some outsourcing concerns.
E.

DepartmentofJustice, AntitrustDivision

Since 1993, The Department of Justice's Antitrust Division has
had a formal Corporate Leniency Program, which accords "leniency" to
corporations that report their own illegal antitrust activity at an early
stage if the self-disclosure meets certain conditions" 6 :
* The self-disclosure occurs before DOJ has begun an
investigation;
* DOJ has not received information about the illegal
activity being reported from any other source;
* The corporation did not coerce another party to
participate in the illegal activity and was not the leader
in, or originator of, the activity;

114 The year 2009 did represent an increase in self-reports over earlier years, but data on
investigations and regulatory audits in earlier years was not provided. See id. at 8 (2009 selfreports); id. at 14 (2009 investigations); id.at 20 (2009 regulatory audit statistics).

115 Id. at 1.
116 DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DivisIoN, CORPORATE LENIENCY POLICY (1993),

available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/0091.pdf. The Antitrust Division had an
Amnesty Program as early as 1978, but amnesty was not granted automatically and the program
had flaws, which led to very few applications and ultimately no cases. See Scott D. Hammond,
Detecting and Deterring Cartel Activity Through an Effective Leniency Program, Presentation at
the International Workshop on Cartels, Brighton England (Nov. 21-22, 2000), available at
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/9928.htm.
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*

After discovering the illegal activity, the corporation
"took prompt and effective action" to terminate its part
in the activity;
* The illegal activity is reported candidly and completely
and the corporation provides full cooperation
throughout the investigation;
* The disclosure is made by the corporation, not
individual executives or officials; and
* Where possible, the corporation makes restitution to
injured parties.
If the first three conditions are not met, but the self-disclosure meets the
remaining conditions as well as the following conditions, it will also
receive leniency if:
* The corporation is the first to come forward and
qualify for leniency with respect to the illegal activity
being reported;
* DOJ does not yet have evidence against the company
that is likely to result in a sustainable conviction; and
* DOJ determines that granting leniency would not be
unfair to others, considering the nature of the illegal
activity, the confessing corporation's role in it, and
when the corporation comes forward.1 17
If the self-disclosure meets either set of conditions, DOJ will not
charge the corporation criminally for the activity being reported and,
since 2004, self-disclosing corporations will only be subject to
restitution of damages, not treble damages. 118 DOJ also has an
individual leniency policy that has analogous conditions for individuals
self-disclosing illegal activity where the corporation does not come
forward. 119 Of course, this policy is quite different from the other selfpolicing policies discussed in this Article and the theoretical models
discussed in Part III because the violations of law involve conspiracies
between multiple entities. The fact that only the one entity can receive
leniency changes the incentives for entities to participate. However, it
is still a self-policing policy and it does provide additional insight into
the aspects of various policies that might make outsourcing concerns
more or less important.
One characteristic of the policy is that leniency requires restitution
to injured parties-thus like EPA's policy it is only the "punitive"
penalties that are forgiven and thus, in theory, self-policers should not
117 DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 116.

118 See Antitrust Criminal Penalty Enhancement and Reform Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108237, 118 Stat. 661.
119 DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIVISIoN, LENIENCY POLICY FOR INDIVIDUALS (1994),

available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/0092.pdf.
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receive any economic benefit from their illegal activity.1 20 While there
have not been any empirical studies of the effect of the policy on cartel
formation or cartel collapse, because of the difficulty in enforcing
antitrust laws, the Corporate Leniency Program plays a very important
role in the overall enforcement program.121 In 2003, the Antitrust
Division received over one disclosure a month and "the majority of the
Division's major international investigations [were] advanced through
the cooperation of an amnesty applicant." 22 Since the policy allows
DOJ to prosecute other antitrust violators, it clearly acts as a
complement to its enforcement programs rather than as a substitute.
The only outsourcing concern that one might have with respect to
the Corporate Leniency Program is that, unlike the Audit Policy, the
identity of self-policers under the Program is not normally made

publicly available.1 23
V.

PRINCIPLES To GUIDE SELF-POLICING POLICIES

As should be clear from the sample of self-policing policies
discussed in the previous Parts, there is a wide variation in both the
design and implementation of such policies. As discussed in Part II, for
a self-policing program to be a justifiable delegation of a public
function to private parties, it must first increase overall efficiency-that
is it must either increase compliance or maintain existing compliance
levels at reduced cost. If a policy can be designed to increase
efficiency, it should then be evaluated with respect to the outsourcing
concerns discussed in this Article.
With regard to the first condition, ideally agencies would use
formal evaluations and analysis to ensure that-at a minimumcompliance does not decrease under the self-policing program.
Additionally, the program should be initially constructed so that it does
not provide perverse incentives for regulated entities to decrease
120 However, companies may be eligible for partial amnesty from penalties in other cases. See
Gary R. Spratling, Making Companies an Offer They Can't Refuse: The Antitrust Division's
Corporate Leniency Policy-An Update, Presentation at the Bar Association of the District of
Columbia's 35th Annual Symposium on Associations and Antitrust (Feb. 16, 1999), available at
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/2247.htm.
121 See Joseph E. Harrington, Jr., Optimal CorporateLeniency Programs,56 J. INDUS. ECON.
215, 215 (2008) ("While it is difficult to assess the role of the leniency program on causing
cartels to collapse or deterring cartels from forming, we do know that it has been widely used.").
122 See James M. Griffin, The Modem Leniency Program After Ten Years: A Summary
Overview of the Antitrust Division's Criminal Enforcement Program, Presentation at the
American Bar Association Section of Antitrust Law Annual Meeting (Aug. 12, 2003), available
at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/201477.htm.
123 See John M. Connor, Anti-Cartel Enforcement by the DOJ: An Appraisal, 5 COMPETITION
L. REV. 89, 96 (2008).

2322

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32:6

compliance efforts and minimize the ability of firms to strategically
self-disclose. While the particular details of each policy will obviously
vary from program to program, one underlying principle is that there
must be some positive chance that regulated entities will be subject to
regulatory inspection and prosecution for detected violations. If entities
that self-police face no or only a very small (approaching zero)
probability of inspection, then in practice there is no enforcement. Not
only could this undermine respect for the law, it also could provide
regulated entities with the opportunity to strategically self-police in
order to reduce future enforcement to zero and then cease to make any
effort to comply, thereby increasing the number of undetected
violations. 124
Additionally, given that several analyses of the Audit Policy
suggest that complete penalty immunity worsens overall compliance
levels and no studies suggest any beneficial result of complete
immunity, I do not think self-policing policies should confer complete
immunity. At a minimum, self-policers should always have to pay a
fine equal to any economic benefit received by violations-otherwise
they are better off violating and self-policing rather than complying.
Unfortunately, not all existing Audit Policies make the distinction
between punitive fines and those related to the economic benefit of noncompliance.
Self-policing policies should also be designed to minimize
outsourcing concerns. With respect to accountability, the concept of
self-policing does not require that accountability or transparency be
sacrificed. Any decrease in accountability is a result of a policy design
or execution choice made by the regulatory agency, and does not appear
to be necessary to achieve efficiency. Of course, enforcement is an area
in which accountability is limited from the start and most agencies
exercise significant discretion in deploying their enforcement resources
and determining the punishment for entities found in violation. Thus, I
would propose two guidelines to ensure that accountability is not
significantly decreased by self-policing: First, all self-disclosures should
be made publicly available, preferably in the same way that other
enforcement data is provided to the public. Second, any right to bring
private action against regulated entities should be protected.
To ensure that self-policing does not become an inherently
governmental function, under any self-policing policy public officials
should retain ultimate discretion in setting final penalties and
determining how violations are to be remediated. Additionally, selfpolicing should never be the sole means of enforcement-not only
because all existing theoretical models of self-policing require a public
124 This does not preclude an agency from rewarding self-policers with reduced future
inspection relative to non-policers, though it might require raising the base inspection rate.
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enforcement mechanism to make the policy work, but also because
doing so ensures that regulated entities do not determine the ultimate
import of regulations. Thus, as a guideline for developing self-policing
programs, I would require that they be used to supplement public
enforcement regimes, and not as substitutes for traditional enforcement.
Finally, to ensure that there is no significant loss of information to
government officials as a result of self-policing, self-policing policies
should require, as EPA's policy does, that entities provide detailed
information as to the nature of the discovered violations.
While these guidelines may seem to be simple or obvious
principles, they have not been universally adopted in all existing selfpolicing policies. Of course, adoption of these principles alone will not
ensure that all self-policing is ultimately justifiable. Thus I also
advocate empirical analyses of all self-policing policies to assess the
relative efficiency gains and outsourcing concerns.
In conclusion, as I hope the Article demonstrates, self-policing is
neither uniformly beneficial, nor uniformly dangerous. The potential
benefits from self-policing are large and, while the concerns over
outsourcing are real, there are ways to minimize many of the concerns
that might lead some to resist outsourcing. Hopefully there will be no
need to trade principles of good government for efficiency if we
appropriately design self-policing policies.

